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25 September 1951

FIEND-VALUABLE

1. Basic Policy

a. Fiend and Valuable are coordinated but entirely separate projects, the former American, the latter British. The basic principle governing these activities is integrated policy coordination with disengagement on the operational level.

(1) All matters pertaining to the policy of the two services concerning the end results desired in Albania and the general methods for the attainment of these ends will be agreed upon jointly. /

(2) All matters concerning the composition and general character of activities of the National Committee for Free Albania will be agreed upon jointly.²

(3) The propaganda lines to be pursued against Albania and with respect to Albania's neighbors will be agreed upon jointly.

(4) Economic measures taken against Albania will be coordinated to achieve maximum effectiveness.

(5) Either service is free to work independently with or to approach other national services in connection with Albanian operations.³

2. Field Operations

a. Fiend and Valuable operations are entirely separate. However, field activities are to be coordinated in general terms to prevent mutual interference. This is to be achieved by exchange of general information regarding areas of operation and approximate timing of activities. A system of quarterly meetings of Fiend and Valuable key field personnel has been established for this purpose and to supplement the other contacts which are maintained in the field.

b. Operational intelligence is to be freely interchanged between Fiend and Valuable in the field. Furthermore, arrangements have been made for the interchange of certain general intelligence and occasional estimates.

SECRET

3. Comments

SECRET

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a. The system has worked satisfactorily so far. Because of the attitude toward British operations on the part of other services, the Greek for example, it is definitely in the interest of the Fiend operation to maintain its separate, independent character, and not to become a joint project with Valuable. Although there appears to be constant pressure from the British to merge the two undertakings, experience has shown that not only would no benefits derive from such an arrangement but in fact certain disadvantages would result insofar as Fiend is concerned.

b. Although no reliable figures are available, it is probable that the U. S. is carrying 90% of the total cost of British-American operations into Albania.

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